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RENT SHARING IN THE MULTI-FIBRE ARRANGEMENT:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM U.S. APPAREL IMPORTS FROM HONG KONG
ABSTRACT
Available estimates of tariff equivalents of quotas and
welfare calculations on the costs of MFA quotas for developing
countries are based on the premise of perfect competition in both
product and license markets. It is also assumed that the
exporting countries which administer the MFA quotas receive all
the scarcity rent. We argue that in the presence of market power
on the buyers' side in the product market combined with
concentration in the license markets, the importing countries may
retain part of this rent, i.e. share it with the exporters.
We analyze US imports of apparel products from Hong Kong to
see if the data conform with all the relevant predictions of the
competitive model. Our method essentially tests whether the
license price inclusive Hong Kong price, adjusted for tariffs and
transport costs, is equal to the domestic (US) price. A
deviation between the two prices is taken to indicate rent
sharing. We test the hypothesis with homogeneous goods, modify
it to take into account compositional differences and, finally,
consider differentiated goods. We find evidence that importers
retain a substantial portion of the MFA quota rents.
Kala Krishna Refik Erzan





The post-World War II era is often hailed as a period of great trade liberalization
through successive rounds of negotiations conducted under the auspices of
GATT, industrial country tariffs have been pared down to their present average
level of about 4% on manufactured goods. Unfortunately, this reduction in tariff
rates has been accompanied by a proliferation of non-tariff barriers. Among
the most important of these non- tariff barriers for developing countries is the
MFA, or Multi- Fibre Arrangement, which sanctions a structure of country- and
product-specific quotas on apparel and textiles, often the most important area
of manufacturing advantage for developing countries.
The MFA has been widely studied and much attention has been devoted
to its welfare consequences.However, this literature has been based on the
presumption of perfect competition in all relevant markets and has suppressed
dynamic aspects of the issues. In such models, as is well known, tariffs and
quotas are equivalent and license prices, when available, equal the implicit spe-
cific tariff. This makes it straightforward to calculate the welfare effects of the
system and to identify losers and winners from the MFA and any of its proposed
reforms.
The assumption of competitive markets in the study of the MFA is usually
defended on the grounds that there are a large number of producers in the
textile and apparel market. In the case of some advanced exporters, notably
Hong Kong, further justification is provided by the fact that the quotas are
efficiently implemented and are, to a large extent, transferable. For example,
Morkre (1984) estimates that US clothing import quotas on Hong Kong in 1980
spawned quota rents of $218 million, or 23% of the total value of clothing imports
from Hong Kong. The central feature of his methodology is that "...theprice
of rights to export textiles from Hong Kong measures the gap between import
price and unit cost in Hong Kong. The rationale is that textile quotas are openly
traded in Hong Kong so that the market price for transfers is expected to reflect
the value of the price-cost difference." 2
Hamilton(1986) also uses Hong Kong quota prices to measure rent income.
In addition, he uses specially-compiled sets of clothing import statistics to cal-
culate f.o.b. unit values for Hong Kong exports to the US, which serve as proxies
1See, for example, the papers contained in Hamilton (1990)whichanalyze the effects of
the MFA and its proposed reforms from a variety of viewpoints.
2Morkre (1984) p.2. He dismisses the suggestion of quota monopolization on the basis of
two observations. First, he finds no evidence of concentration in quota holdings among the
top four firms in 10 product categories in 1980. (However, he does acknowledge that this
evidence may not be definitive because there may be ownership links between different quota
holders.) Secondly, the quota utilization rates in 1980 exceed 100% in all but one category,
whereas he expects quota monopolization to result in short-shipping. His first observation, as
we shall see, is not consistent with the data we have, which show high degrees of concentration
in certain categories like men's wool coats (MFA category 434) and cotton woven shirts (MFA
category 340). His second observation is not relevant because the implementation of the
restraint system creates incentives for quota holders to use up all their licenses.
1for the rent-inclusive export prices. Dividing rent income by the rent-inclusive
US value of exports, he arrives at the US export tax equivalent rate of textile
and apparel quotas on Hong Kong, which he then converts to the import tariff
equivalent (MTE) rate by taking the ratio of c.i.f. and f.o.b. values of clothing
imports from Hong Kong. He calculates this MTE rate as 9% in 1981 and 37%
in 1982.
Trela and Whalley (1988, 1990) employ a general equilibrium model to an-
alyze the effects of bilateral quota restrictions imposed by the US, Canada and
the EC on 14 product categories from 34 developing countries (including Hong
Kong). Like Morkre, their methodology for obtaining the supply price of quota
restricted products involves the use of data on Hong Kong quota prices: they
compute the Hong Kong supply price by subtracting the quota price from the
US price, then they compute the production costs of quota restricted products
in other exporting countries by multiplying the unit cost in Hong Kong with
the ratio of the exporting country's relative wage rate in the textile and ap-
parel industry compared to Hong Kong. Using 1986 data, they estimate both
global and national welfare costs of the MFA. Their results suggest global gains
from the elimination of quotas and tariffs of more than $17 billion —ofwhich
$11 billion will accrue to developing countries —andgains to the US from the
removal of quotas of $3 billion.
We do not, in this paper, question the assumption of perfect competition
a priori. Rather, we ask if it is possible to test whether all the results of the
static competitive model are borne out in the data. Oddly enough, this basic
issue has never been addressed in the literature. Note that conceptually, there
exist two markets: the market for products and the market for licenses. In the
product market, there can be imperfect competition on the side of the buyers,
i.e. monopsony or oligopsony, and/or on the side of the sellers, i.e. monopoly
or oligopoly. In the license market, we need to consider as well who owns the
licenses —that is, whether the licenses are in the hands of the exporters (who
may or may not be the producers themselves) or the importers or buyers (be
they consumers or independent retailers). Again, there can be market power on
either or both sides of the license market. Clearly, many different combinations
of imperfections can arise in the two markets and it is beyond the scope of this
paper to study them all. Our approach is not to point to and model a particular
form of imperfection but to see whether the implications of perfect competition
in all markets do in fact hold.
It is well understood that when market imperfections exist, product prices
become endogenous, thus allowing producers to appropriate quota rents by rais-
ing their supply price. In this case, a quota has very different effects from a tariff
which generates the same level of imports. In particular, the price difference
between the quota-restricted and world markets, which we will call the potential
rent per license, need not equal the tariff which would induce this level of im-
ports. For this reason, licence prices need not reflect import-equivalent tariffs.
(See Krishna (1990a).)
2Moreover, the potential rent per license need not equal the actual license
price if there is "rent sharing". This is to be distinguished from "rent appro-
priation". The distinction is crucial. By affecting product prices themselves,
producers with market power in effect appropriate rents from quotas. We will
call this "rent appropriation" and use "rent sharing" to denote the sharing of
potential rents between the license holders and other agents, given the price
differential created by the quota. In other words, rent sharing is said to occur
when the the license price falls short of the price differential in the quota- re-
stricted and world markets. As we argue in the next section, the theoretical
literature in the area has focused on rent appropriation and has ignored rent
sharing. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by testing for rent sharing in the
MFA.
We base our empirical case on Hong Kong because it is often held up as the
best-functioning and most competitive exporter of clothing to the US. Licenses
are relatively freely traded in Hong Kong compared to other MFA-restricted
countries, and the quota implementation process is clearly documented. As a
result, it is the least likely to exhibit behavior consistent with market imper-
fections. Evidence of any such behavior from Hong Kong would therefore cast
substantial doubt on the suitability of the static competitive model for analyzing
the effects of the MFA.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we first outline the
competitive model, then we discuss how different kinds of imperfections may
affect the results of this model. We argue that rent sharing can occur when
there is market power on the side of buyers, which may or may not be combined
with imperfections in the license market. As our focus is not theoretical, we
use very simple versions of these models. however, the flavor of the results
carries over in more general versions. In Section 3, we briefly discuss the data
we use. Details of how the data were put together can be found in Appendix
B, which carefully describes our sources and procedures as well as the problems
that remain with the data. In Section 4, we give a quick summary of Hong
Kong's textile quota system.
Section 5 sets up the first model we test. This model deals with testing for
rent sharing in the presence of quotas when imports and domestically-produced
goods are homogeneous. We extend this in Section 6 to incorporate composi-
tional differences in the aggregate goods whilst maintaining the homogeneity
assumption of its component parts. Section 7 deals with the implications of
product differentiation. Section 8 summarizes our results and makes some con-
cluding remarks.
32 The Basic Models
2.1 Perfect Competition
The basecase(which constitutes our null hypothesis in Section 5) is one with
competition in all the relevant markets. Both the demand and supply sides
of the product market are assumed to be competitive and, in addition, license
holders act competitively and are willing and able to sell at the price that clears
the license market.
This model is illustrated diagramatically in Figure 1, which is the standard
textbook depiction. In Figure 1, RD represents residual demand from the im-
porting country which we will call the US. It is given by subtracting US supply
and supply from sources other than Hong Kong from total demand in the US.
RS depicts the residual supply from Hong Kong. This is supply from Hong
Kong less demand from all sources other than the US. The intersection of the
two gives the world price in the absence of quotas and the level of imports from
Hong Kong to the US. If a quota is set allowing only V units to be imported, the
home price at which this level of imports is demanded exceeds the world price
at which it is supplied. Their difference gives the license price, which can be
interpreted as the implicit tariff. That is, if the quota were replaced by a specific
tariff at this level, the same amount of imports would be induced. Tariffs and
quotas are therefore equivalent.
2.2 Market power on the seller's side: "rent appropria-
tion"
As is well known, the above argument breaks down with imperfectly competitive
markets. Bhagwati (1965) analyzes three departures from the base model of
competition (which he calls case 1). He looks at the effect of monopoly in
domestic supply and in the license market, as well as some combinations of
these. When there is monopoly only in domestic supply, a quota makes demand
less elastic for price increases, thereby augmenting monopoly power. As a tariff
does not eliminate the foreign supply response, we get non-equivalence between
the two. This is his case 2.
In his case 3, he considers competitive supply at home and abroad, but
monopoly in license holdings. By affecting the utilization of licenses, the mo-
nopolist holder of licenses affects their value. The utilization rate is chosen to
maximize total license value. This makes the effective quota endogenous and
creates non-equivalence between tariffs and quotas.
In his case 4, he adds monopoly in domestic supply to his case 3. He considers
two sub-cases: 4a, where the license holder is not the domestic monopolist; and
4b, where he is the domestic monopolist. Thus, 4a becomes a case where the
hQme market is a duopoly. The solution concept chosen is essentially a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium. Here, a quota changes the market structure whereas a tariff
4does not, so the two are not equivalent. In 4b, the monopolist holds all the
licences and so he can even further augment his monopoly power over case 2
by effectively choosing his utilization ratio to maximize the sum of profits and
license revenues. As a quota enhances his monopoly power, it is again not
equivalent to a tariff.
Bhagwati does not address the possibility of foreign market power. If the
foreign sellers have market power, no supply curve exists as the supply price is
chosen to maximize profits. This makes the world price a choice variable and
its determination the result of profit-maximizing decisions of the suppliers. If
the sellers have no licenses, they will have an incentive to raise their price to
obtain the rents from the quota.
Take, for example, the case where there is a single foreign supplier of the
product and markets are segmented. It is clearly optimal for the monopolist to
raise his price in response to a quota so as to appropriate the entire quota rent.
By closing the gap between the demand price and the supply price, the mo-
nopolist effectively strips the licenses of any value. This model with segmented
markets is developed diagramatically in Takacs (1987) and is mentioned in Shi-
bata (1968) as well, and most recently in Krugman and Helpman (1989).
Krishna (1990b, 1990c) further develops a model in which there is costless
arbitrage between the markets so the foreign monopolist cannot practise price
discrimination. The monopolist's price is an endogenous variable —by charg-
ing a high price, he can appropriate rents and he chooses to do so if this is
profitable. Of course, this price depends on the quota level and his allocation
of licenses. Even here, as long as the license market is frictionless and compet-
itive, it is still the case that the value of a license equals the difference in the
domestic price and the world price. However, in this model as well as in those
of Bhagwati discussed previously, the license price is endogenous and depends
on other parameters such as the allocation of licenses and the product market
structure and behavior.
To summarize, the existence of market imperfections in general can result
in the non-equivalence of tariffs and quotas. However, our focus is not on the
equivalence issue but on what the licence price reflects. In other words, we are
concerned with rent sharing and not rent appropriation. When there is product
market power on the seller's side, the license price becomes an endogenous
variable used by the producer to effect rent appropriation. However, the identity
continues to hold that the license price is equal to the difference between the
domestic (demand) price and the world (supply) price, so that there is no rent
sharing.
30n the other hand, if they own some licenses, then this incentive is tempered as they take
into account the value of their license holdings.
4There may be domestic competitive supply in which case the monopolist's demand in
what follows should be interpreted as the residual demand curve.
52.3 Market power on the buyer's side: "rent sharing"
If there is monopsony power, that is, if there is a single buyer, then the story is
quite different. Assume that the licence market is competitive as is the supply
side. In Figure 2, the monopsonist retailer has a marginal revenue curve, MR,
which is derived from the market demand for apparel, D, and he faces an upward
sloping supply, S. His marginal cost curve, MC, lies to the left of S; this is
because he has to pay a higher price for all the inframarginal units in order to
purchase an additional unit of apparel.
Under free trade, the monopsonist will import V1' units of apparel, which
is given by the intersection of MCandMR. The lowest price at which this
quantity will be supplied is pF', and the monopsonist is willing to pay up to P*.
Since he is the sole importer, however, he can choose his price and so he will
offer the lowest price, pF, and sell the goods in the home market at price P.
Now suppose a quota, V, is imposed on apparel imports. The monopsonist's
supply curve then becomes the kinked line, ABE and his marginal cost curve
becomes ACE. The lowest price at which the quota amount will be supplied
is Ps(V), and the monopsonist will not pay more than pD(V), which is the
price for which he will sell the imports in the home market. If he pays P, where
ps(V) < D<pD(V), then the price of a quota license will be P —ps(V),
i.e. the difference between the price paid and the supply price charged. Of
course, the monopsonist will never choose to pay more than the supply price
charged so he will buy the V units at price P5(V) and the license price will be
zero. Note that this occurs not because there is no price differential in the home
and world markets, but because the monopsonist, as the only importer of the
good, can prevent trade from equalizing these prices. The more restrictive the
quota is, the lower will be the price paid by the monopsonist. In any case, the
competitive exporters are paid exactly enough to induce them to sell and they
receive no rent.
It is important for us to emphasize that in this case, unlike all the previous
ones discussed, the license price is not given by the deviation of the domestic
price from the world price. The license to import only has value if the price
offered by the monopsonist exceeds the supply price. Since the monopsonist has
sole buying power, the license price is always zero. The difference between the
home price and the world price, however, is given by P'(V) —ps(V)in Figure
2, and it is not equal to zero. Thus, monopsony power causes the license price
to diverge from the difference in the supply and demand price.
Now suppose there is competitive supply but concentration in license hold-
ings as well as market power on the buyer's side. This seems like a better
assumption for the US-Hong Kong apparel trade situation, since the mere ex-
istence of active trading in quota licenses in Hong Kong is evidence that the
license have value. In this case, there is bilateral monopoly power, and the issue
becomes qne of sharing the potential license rents. The potential rent from a
5SimiIar results can be shown to go through for oligopsony. See Krishna and Tan (1991).
6license equals the difference in the supply price in Hong Kong and the demand
price in the US market. If a price between these is the outcome of the bargain-
ing process, then the license price is positive. However, the two prices are not
separated by exactly the license price because of rent sharing. 6
As a stark illustration of this argument, suppose that all the import licenses
are held by a single exporter (who may or may not be a producer), and that the
license price is determined by a Nash bargaining process between the monop-
sonist and the license holder. The license holder's objective is to maximize his
profit L, where:
7rL=VL.
The monopsonist's objective is to maximize his profit lrM, where:
= [pD(V) —L—P5(V)]V.
pD(.) is the inverse residual demand function and P5(.) is the inverse residual
import supply function, so PD(V) is the demand price and Ps(V) is the supply
price for the quota, V units. The license price is found by maximizing the
weighted product of both parties' deviation from their fall-back payoff:
H = (VL)'[(P°(V) —P5(V)
—L)V]'.
For simplicity, we assume both parties receive nothing in the absence of an
agreement, so their fall-back payoffs are equal to zero.The parameters /3
and(1 —/3)represent the bargaining strengths of the license holder and the
monopsonist respectively, where 0 </3 < 1.




which yields the solutions:
L=0,
L = pD(V) —P5(V),and
L = j3[PD(V)_PS(V)],
6The two prices may not be separated by exactly the license price for other reasons as well.
These include factors such as unmeasured costs created by te quota and licensing system
itself. For example, if it is hard to get through the paperwork and bureaucracy imposed by
the implementation system or to obtain licenses, then the difference between the demand
and supply prices will exceed the license price. Thus, no test of whether the two prices are
separated by the license price (plus any tariff and transport costs that apply) will be entirely
clear about the cause of the difference. Also, the absence of this difference does not rule out
market power on the supply side as argued earlier, so it does not imply competitive supply.
7Tbis is not an unreasonable assumption for the license holder because quota licenses are
product- and country- specific so that in the absence of an agreement with the monopsonist,
the exporter does not have the option of selling his licenses elsewhere.
7of which only the third satisfies the second order condition for a maximum.
Therefore the license price which is the outcome of the Nash bargaining setup
between the license holder and the monopsonist is given by:
L =fl[pD(v)
—pS(V)]
Themore powerful the license holder is, the higher is the license price. In
the extreme case when /3 =1,the license holder has all the bargaining power
and so he extracts the entire quota rent VL, where the license price L is exactly
equal to the difference between the demand and supply prices. At the opposite
extreme when /3 =0,the monopsonist calls all the shots: for each unit, he
pays only the supply price P and reaps the rent given by the difference between
the demand and supply prices. The license holder gets nothing as the license
price is equal to zero. For a value of/3 between 0 and 1, an intermediate result
will obtain and the license price will not reflect the full difference between the
demand and supply prices.
In Section 5, we look at the relationship between the US price and the Hong
Kong price, which includes the license price as well as tariffs and transport
costs. In the absence of rent sharing, as argued above, these two should be equal.
Moreover, their difference should not depend on factors such as concentration in
quota holdings and the quota size and utilization ratio. In this way, we estimate
the extent of rent sharing and the factors that seem to be influencing it. In
Section 6, we allow for compositional effects to create differences in aggregate
prices and in Section 7, we test if prices differ because of product differentiation.
3 The Data
The data utilized in this study cover the time period 1981-88 and pertain to
three broad areas: domestically-produced apparel, imported apparel from Hong
Kong and license holdings for apparel imports from Hong Kong. We did not at-
tempt to obtain data on all categories of apparel. There are severe difficulties in
assembling a consistent panel of data due to the different and changing classifica-
tion systems used in reporting information on imports and domestic production.
Therefore, we chose groups of apparel such that these consistency problems were
minimized. Our objective was to get as many relatively consistently-defined, dis-
aggregated groups that we could find or develop concordances for between the
different classification systems employed.
We identified ten such groups. They are: (1) dresses; (2) skirts; (3) playsuits;
(4) sweaters; (5) trousers; (6) men's coats; (7) women's coats; (8) woven shirts;
(9) knit shirts; and (10) underwear. We obtained data for these groups for the
following variables between 1981 and 1988. The variables are defined below. In
our notation, the subscript i indexes the apparel group, and I indexes the year.
pUS =Unitvalue of US production.
8f.Jf K = F.o.b. Hong Kong price. This includes the license price.
= Ad valorem tariff in the US.
T81 = Transport cost per unit from Hong Kong to the US.
p.11K = Adjusted Hong Kong price, where P/[1 = + t,) + T.
Q1K = Imports from Hong Kong.
H,1 = Numbers equivalent of the Herfindahi index of concentration
in licence holding.
= Quota level for imports.
QYK U, = Utilization ratio of imports, where U, =
V1
The sources of these data and details on how they were created can be found
in Appendix B.
4 Hong Kong's Textile Quota System
Hong Kong prides itself on administering an efficient textile quota system. The
initial quota allocation is historically based. Past performance, transfers and
quota level changes guide the process by which these allocations change in sub-
sequent years.
When a product category is newly brought under restraint, the quotas are
allocated according to past performance, 8 i.e. each company gets a quota
amount corresponding to its share in total shipments of that particular category
to the market concerned. Where the manufacturer and the exporter are not
the same company, they each share the quota pertaining to a shipment on a
50/50 basis.If the level of total shipments exceeds the restraint limit, the
allocations are scaled down proportionately. If the quota is larger than total
past performance, then the balance remaining is put into a "free quota pool",
which is open to any firm registered with the Hong Kong Trade Department
which has documentary proof of an overseas order.
Quota holders are allowed to transfer a part of their quota to other firms.
There are two types of quota transfers: permanent transfers, in which the trans-
feree obtains the use of the quota for the year in question and, based on its
performance against the transferred amount, receives a quota allocation inthe
following year; and temporary transfers, in which the transferee obtains the use
of the quota for the year in question, but the performance against the trans-
ferred quantity is attributed to the transferor. In order to allow sufficient time
8The reference period is usually the most recent 12-month period for which shipment
performance can be ascertained prior to the introduction of the restraint.
91n the case of finished piece-goods, quotas are allocated on a 40/30/30 basis among the
exporter, the finisher and the weaver. In the case of finished fabrics manufactured using
imported grey fabrics, quotas are allocated on a 50/50 basis to the exporter and the finisher.
9for the transferee to obtain the quota, transfer applications are not normally
accepted after the middle of November. Free quotas are not transferable.
Under Hong Kong's textile quota system, both the utilization rate and the
amount of transfers are important factors in determining a firm's future quota
allocation. A firm which uses less than 95% of its quota holding will obtain an
allocation in the subsequent year equal to the amount it used; a firm which uses
95% or more of its quota holding will be given an allocation equal to 100% of
its holding; and a firm which uses 95% or more of its quota holding and does
not transfer out any of its quota (on either a temporary or permanent basis)
will be awarded an additional amount equivalent to the growth factor for that
category provided for in the restraint agreement.
In addition, a firm which transfers out 50% or more of its quota holdings on
a temporary basis in a year is liable to have its quota allocation reduced in the
following year, 10whereasa firm which transfers in 35% or more of its quota
holdings on a temporary basis during the year is eligible for a bonus allocation
in the following year.
Finally, a firm which obtains a free quota and utilizes 95% or more of it
qualifies for a quota allocation in the subsequent year; a firm which fails to
utilize at least 95% of its free quota may be debarred from future participation
in free quota schemes for a period of time.
To a certain extent, unused quotas may be transferred between categories
(under the "swing provision") and between years (under the "carry-over" and
"carry-forward provisions").
As quota entitlements in a subsequent restraint period are based on shipment
performance in the preceding period, quotas can only be allocated after this per-
formance has been fully verified against shipping documents. This verification
process usually takes two to three months. In order to make a portion of the
quotas available during the first few months of the year, therefore, the Trade
Department makes preliminary quota allocations to companies. Final quota
allocations are normally made in March and they supersede any preliminary
allocations.
All textile and apparel exports from Hong Kong have to be covered by valid
export licenses issued by the Director of Trade. Export licenses are only issued
to firms which are able to supply quota to cover the consignment in question.
Valid licenses are required to bring the shipment on board. An export license
is normally valid for 28 days from the date of issue (or, where applicable, until
the end of the year, whichever is earlier). The consignment must be shipped
within this period. The final licensing date is the first day of December. All
licenses covering shipments applied for against quotas held by a company have
to be taken out not later than this date, although shipments may be effected
up to the last day of the year.
10This amount was reduced to 35% in June 1985, but was changed back to 50% in July of
the following year.
10Further details of Hong Kong's textile quota system can be found in the
Hong Kong Trade Department publication, Textiles Export Control System. A
good description of the system is also contained in Morkre (1979, 1984).
5 Testing for Rent Sharing: Homogeneous Goods
In this and the following two sections, we develop and implement procedures
to test for the existence of rent sharing. In the case of homogeneous goods, if
there is no rent sharing, the license price equals the difference in the price of US
goods and the price of imports from Hong Kong when the latter is adjusted for
tariffs and transportation costs. Our data-set for the ten apparel groups does
not contain license prices explicitly. However, the license price is included in the
f.o.b. Hong Kong price. Therefore, we can test for rent sharing by looking at
whether the f.o.b. price in Hong Kong, adjusted for tariffs and transport costs,
equals the US price.
Figures 3(i)-(x) are scattergrarns of these two sets of prices for each of the
ten apparel groups. In each scattergram, the points either lie entirely above
the 45 degree line or entirely below it, indicating that the US price and the
license-inclusive Hong Kong price are not equal. However, when the data are
pooled, as in Figure 3(xi), the points appear to lie more or less around the 45
degree line —thisprima facie evidence, then, seems to discount the existence
of rent sharing! Yet, while it seems reasonable to assume that Hong Kong
producers are competitive, it is not clear that market power does not exist in
the market for quota licenses and on the side of the US purchasers. For example,
an editorial in the Hong Kong trade journal, Textile Asia, alleges that: "Quota
price fluctuations do not in fact reflect normal supply and demand but the
course of manipulation by the quota holders;""andGoto (1989) claims that:
"Although governments of exporting countries under the MFA often allocate
export licenses in a manner that helps exporters capture the quota rent, many
of these exporters face large importing enterprises that can negotiate prices
that capture some of the rent for themselves." 12Asargued in Section 2, the
existence of monopsony power can lead to rent sharing.
This is separate from the issue of whether or not product markets are perfect
on the sellers' side. Imperfect product markets per se do not imply rent sharing
as we define it, although they do affect who gains and who loses from a quota.
We focus only on rent sharing, which results from buyer power and not on rent
appropriation, which results from seller power.
In regression (1), we regress the adjusted Hong Kong price on the US price, a
constant, the quota utilization ratio, the quota level and the numbers equivalent
of the Herfindahi Index, which measures concentration in the license holdings
and proxies for market power in the license market. The numbers equivalent
11Textile Asia, March 1989.
'2Goto (1989) p.218.
11of the Herfindahi Index is defined as wheres equals the share of license
holder i in total licenses. Regression (1) is therefore of the form:
pHK + i3Pff5 + -,'H1 + Wjg + v;g+e (1)
The right-hand-side variables can be considered as exogenous variables. If
the US is a large country, P5 is properly taken as given. As quota license
allocations are historically determined, H1 can be also taken as given though
it does vary over time with the composition of exports. The quota level, %4,
is exogenously determined. The utilization rate, (Jjg,shouldbe unity if the
quota is binding, and any departure from unity is assumed to reflect exogenous
difficulties in attaining full utilization due to frictions in the implementation
system.
The regression is run on pooled data across the ten apparel groups for the
years 1981 through 1988. If there is no rent sharing and the goods are homoge-
neous, we should expect to observe p17K = pys. In other words, in regression
(1), the constant should be zero and the coefficient on the US price should be
unity; furthermore, none of the other variables should be significant. The as-
sumption that US and Hong Kong apparel are perfect substitutes ensures that
the license- inclusive Hong Kong price has to equal the domestic price in the US.
This means that the Hong Kong supply price (exclusive of the license price) has
to vary one for one with the license price. For example, if the US is a large coun-
try, a reduction in the quota level will tend to raise the license price; but this
will be wholly absorbed by the Hong Kong suppliers, who will have to reduce
their supply price so as to remain competitive. Therefore, a quota reduction
will make licenses costlier, but reduce the supply price at the same time so that
PitHK remains unchanged overall. Similarly, changes in the license utilization
rate will affect the license price but not P/i" since the supply price will adjust
to maintain the equality between P11f' and pgs. The concentration of license
holdings should not affect Pff K unless there are substantial search costs.
The results of regression (1) are reported in Table 1. Note thatis sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 1% level, and that Hong Kong prices are
lower than US prices in general. This suggests that the license price embodied
in p/f K falls short of the gap between the domestic price (P TS)andthe world
price. Moreover, we are able to conclusively reject the null hypothesis of perfect
competition everywhere, i.e. the hypothesis that 3 = 1 and c = = 6 = = 0
jointly. The hypothesis that /3=1 can be rejected at the 1% level. The regres-
sion results may be interpreted as follows.
We can think of & as the fixed component of rent sharing and /3 as the
marginal component of rent sharing. A $1 increase in the US price, therefore,
is associated with a $0.53 increase in the Hong Kong price —thismay indicate
that $0.47 of the price differential or rent is retained in the US.13
'31tis possible that ther cost factors associated with the quota system may account for
part of this margin.
12In addition, note that ceteris paribus, increasing license market concentra-
tion lowers the Hong Kong price. We would expect that greater concentration
increases the bargaining power of the license holders who will, in turn, seek
to raise the license price. As the license price is included in the Hong Kong
price, we would therefore expect greater concentration in license holdings to be
associated with a higher Hong Kong price. However, it is also possible that
fragmentary quota holdings make it inconvenient for firms to obtain sufficient
export licenses when they have large overseas orders. This increased search cost
would then be reflected in a higher Hong Kong price. Our results seem to sug-
gest that the second effect outweighs the first; this is not too surprising since
the Hong Kong quota system penalizes license hoarding, thereby weakening the
first effect. In any case, we reiterate that in the standard model, the degree
of concentration in license holdings should not affect the equality of pHs and
p.HK Yet the observed coefficient on H is significant at the 1% level, which
directly contradicts this prediction.
Although the coefficients on Uj and V are small, they are also significant at
the 1% level. A higher quota utilization rate, with everything else held constant,
raises the Hong Kong price. This could be because a higher utilization rate
makes licenses harder to get. This increases the bargaining strength of the
license holders and consequently raises the license price and the Hong Kong
price of which it is a component.
A higher quota reduces the Hong Kong price, all else constant. Again, the
reason for this may be due to the fact that a larger quota increases license
availability and reduces the power of license holders. This in turn reduces the
license price and the Hong Kong price. Of course, in the absence of rent sharing,
neither of these variables should be significant —p1[Kshould always adjust to
exactly match Pff .
Theresults of regression (1) therefore seem consistent with the existence of
monopsony power in the market for a homogeneous good in the face of imper-
fections in the license market —thereseems to be a gap between the world
price and the domestic price which is not completely closed by the license price.
6 Allowing for a Composition Effect
In the previous section, we found a price differential between US-produced ap-
parel and imports from Hong Kong. This seems to suggest that some rent
sharing does exist. However, there may be an alternative explanation for this
price differential, namely, that the Hong Kong product mix is not the same as
that of the US. In other words, the null hypothesis described in the beginning of
this section may be valid for the component MFA categories but not for the ag-
gregate apparel groups. For example, the prices of cotton dresses, wool dresses
and dresses, made of manmade fibre may be the same in both the US and Hong
Kong, but if the US produces relatively more wool dresses, which are relatively
13more expensive, then the unit price of US dresses on the whole will exceed the
unit price of Hong Kong dresses on the whole. We cannot directly compare the
composition of the US and Hong Kong aggregate goods since the component
categories are not the same. However, there is a way to get around this, as
outlined below where we test the importance of this composition effect.
Let jdenotethe apparel group (j=1..., 10), and let i denote the MFA
categories that make up apparel group j(i= 1, .. ., n.)Then US unit
price of apparel group j,maybe written as:
f)US
PUS pUS'j —USUS j —iir)!
—j
where P(j5 is US unit price of the ii" MFA category belonging to apparel group
j,Q,E.5is US output of the i' MFA category of apparel group j,QJ'5is total
US output of apparel group jand is simply the quantity weight of category
i in apparel group j,>,=1. Similarly, Hong Kong unit price of apparel
group jmaybe written as:
pHK pHK''.7 — DHKHK i ii ()HK —£jjWi
where >, =1.
Note that we have information only on PJJS p/IK, pHK and w('K. Since
the US production data is not broken down into MFA categories, we do not
know P,JS and w5. Suppose we make the simplifying assumption that:
pUS c.+pHK (4)
Then c captures the extent of rent sharing as it denotes the price difference
between the US and Hong Kong of apparel group j.14 Putting(4) in (2) and
subtracting (3) gives us:
pUS p11K — .. p11K Jj JJ—J+'J4ij
where 0,, denotes the difference between US and Hong Kong weighting of the
th category of apparel group j,and,=0. If there is no rent sharing, a,
equals zero. 15
Nowwe want to test whether the price difference between the US and Hong
Kong for each apparel group jisdue to differences in the composition of the
14We make this assumption both for simplicity and in order to keep as many degrees of
freedom as possible given our data limitations.
15A more general formulation of (4) which allows for fixed and marginal components of rent
sharing would have:
pUS = , + 1jpJK
14group or due to rent sharing. Therefore we are interested in the significance
of the O, 's and a1. Specifically, if our null hypothesis states that there is no
compositional difference between US and Hong Kong apparel groups, and no
rent sharing, then 0*1 = 0 for all i, i = 1,..., n and a1 = 0.
Consider, for example, a typical apparel group equation with n = 3 cate-
gories. Equation (5) is simply:
pUS pHK a1 + 011P('< + o2P21j" + 031+ e. (6)
We impose the restriction that+ 02j + 0 = 0 so that equation (6) becomes:
pUS —pHK= a1 + 021(P21" —p1HK)+ 031(P31" —p1IIK)+ c,.(7)
We estimate a1, 02j and 03j by running an equation like (7) for each apparel
group j,j =1, .. ., 10.Table 2 lists the MFA categories, i, used for each apparel
group, j.Foreach equation, we test for the composition effect using an F-test
of the hypothesis that Oj = 0 for all component MFA categories i, and we test
for the price effect using a simple t-test of the hypothesis that a1 = 0. We also
test for both of these jointly using an F-test.
The results of the ten equations are shown in Tables 3 and 4. For all ten
apparel groups, we were unable to reject at the 5% level the hypothesis that
= 0 for all i. Thus, there seems to be little support for the argument that the
price differential for the apparel groups are due to differences in their relative
composition. Admittedly, the power of these tests is very low since we have only
eight observations for each equation. The rent sharing term, a1, is significantly
different from zero for four apparel groups: skirts, playsuits, women's coats and
underwear.
In the case of dresses, skirts, woven shirts and knit shirts, the US-Hong
Kong price differential is mainly white noise, i.e. we cannot reject at the 5%
level the hypothesis that a1 = 0 = 02j = 03j = 0. For the other apparel
groups, however, this hypothesis does not hold.
To summarize, we find no evidence of compositional differences between
the US- and Hong Kong-produced apparel groups. Of the six apparel groups
for which a significant US-Hong Kong price differential exists, three exhibit a
significant rent sharing effect. Only in four categories can we not reject the joint
hypothesis of no rent sharing and no composition effect.
for all apparel groups j. Then (5) becomes:
pUS -pHK=+
where = HK.For each of the ten apparel groups, we tested the null hypothesis
that 13, =Iby means of an F-test on the above model versus the restricted model where ,9,,=0.We could not reject the null hypothesis for nine of the ten groups. Therefore,
the assumption of f3j =1in equation (4) is not too far off the mark.
157 Allowing for Differentiated Products
In Section 5, we found that the license-inclusive price of Hong Kong imports
fell short of the US price. This, together with our finding in Section 6 that
there was no substantial difference in the composition of the aggregate apparel
groups in the US and Hong Kong, provides strong evidence of the existence of
rent sharing under the assumption of homogeneous goods.
What if there exist real or perceived differences between US- produced ap-
parel and imports from Hong Kong? If US and Hong Kong goods are not perfect
substitutes, then the price of Hong Kong products (including the license price)
need not equal the price of US-produced clothing, even in the absence of rent
sharing. In other words, if we drop the assumption of homogeneous goods then
the price differential observed in the previous sections could simply be an in-
dication of product differentiation instead of (or together with) rent sharing.
While we are unable to deal with product differentiation in general because of
data limitations, 16 we can control for certain aspects of it, as is done below.
Suppose imports from hong Kong are of a different quality than domestically-
produced clothing. Following Rodriguez (1979), we can think of the quality of
a product as the amount of "services" obtained from its consumption. These
"services" are a homogeneous good with a uniform price, s,. To the extent that
two products embody unequal amounts of "services", they will differ in quality
and hence, in price. Let q5 denote the amount of "services" in one unit of
US-produced clothing i at time t, and qf1 the amount of "services" in one unit
of Hong Kong-produced clothing i at time t. Then P1t)S = sqg5 + u, and
p.HK = Sit qJK + v,, where tz, and v are random error terms. Therefore,
oJIK DUS — JfKUS', 1 — — — ; —f v, —
or:
DHK —DUS jHKUS', —'-,,—rS, q1 —q• —r*i,
whereej = v, —esatisfies the usual assumptions for a random error term.
Let Z, denote the difference between the quality of Hong Kong clothing and
US clothing, i.e. Z, = s1(q(f'< —qS).
Recall regression (1) which was of the form:
p11K = + /3P1 + yH1 + 6U, + Vj + ei.
Since we have no way of measuring s1,q,[K or q5, we cannot hold quality
differences constant by including Z as an independent variable in Equation
(1). However, if we take quality differences to be fixed over time, then we can
'6IdealIy, we would like to be able to estimate a simultaneous equation system based on
Arrnington's (1989) model.
16control for them using standard econometric techniques. 17Let:
= .(jHK —US)
wherer is a constant; .j is the average price of a service from good i over the
eight years; qJ1K is the average number of services in a Hong Kong-produced
good i over the eight years; and is the average number of services in a US-
produced good i over the eight years. The fixed effect, Z1 is therefore defined
astimes the average US-Hong Kong quality difference.
The "true" equation, taking into account quality differences, should then be:
pHK = a' ++ 'H+ S'U ++ rZ1 + . (8)
By assuming homogeneity and thereby excluding Z, Equation (1) has re-
gression coefficients which suffer from omitted variable bias. The sign of the
bias could be positive or negative, depending on whether the movement in Z, is
due to the a change in the average price of a service or a change in the average
number of services in a Hong Kong good relative to a US good. For example,
if there is an improvement in the average quality of Hong Kong goods coupled
with a deterioration in the average quality of US goods, then Z and P'/'< will
rise and pTS will fall —inthis case, Z is negatively correlated with P'
I7 fact, we can decompose Z into a fixed effect and two other components which vary
over time:
—-.'-HK-US iHK-.-HK US -.—US Lie — — q,, + —s,q
— — s,q1
=irZ1+irjZj+ ir2Z2.
7r,r1 andare constants, i,isthe average price of a service from good i over the eight years;
JK is the average number of services in a Hong Kong-produced good i over the eight years;
qUSisthe average number of services in a US-produced good i over the eight years. The
fixed effect, Z1 is equal to —jUS)ortimes the average US-Hong Kong quality
difference; Z =—(s,tq
—qHK),or -timesthe deviation of Hong Kong quality (in
value terms) from its average value; and Z2 =_...(s1qS
—11qUS),or times the
deviation of US quality (in value terms) from its average value. The "true" equation, taking
into account quality differences, should actually be:
pHK =or'+ ,3'P,'[ + y'H1 + 5'V, + 'Vi + irZ1+ ir1Z1 + W2Z2.e+
Wehave no measure of Z1, or Z21 but their omission is less serious because the resulting
bias, if any, in (3 is likely to be upward. To see this, note that Z11 is non- negatively correlated
with both P/' and pus A higher Z11 implies a better Hong Kong quality (in value terms)
relative to the average and hence, a higher Hong Kong price; a higher Z11 could reflect a
higher price of a service relative to the average, in which case we would observe a higher
US price. (Of course, if the higher Z reflects a greater number of services embodied in a
Hong Kong good relative to its average, then there is no reason to expect a corresponding
change in the US price. In this case, leaving out Z1 will not bias our estimate of 3 since
the omitted variable causes a bias only if it is correlated with both the dependent variable
and the included variable.) Similarly Z2.t is non- positively correlated with both and
pUS Consequently, the omission of Zi, and if it causes any bias at all, will make our
estimate of/I in Equation (1) too big.
17positively correlated with P/[K, and both effects work to bias the estimate of
,8 downward in Equation (1), 18 thus creating an impression of rent sharing.
Furthermore, we can expect a negative correlation between Z1 and %' —it
has been shown 19 that more restrictive quotas tend to induce imports of a
higher quality, since quotas are typically volume, rather than value restrictions.
Therefore, the omission of Z2 would cause the estimate of in regression (1) to
be biased downward. There is no clear relation between quality differences and
licence concentration or quota utilization, so that we have no prior expectation
as to the effect on the coefficients on H and Uj caused by the omission of Z1.
There are two ways to control for the unmeasurable "fixed effects", Z1. One
way is to make use of our panel data to construct "within" estimators of the
regression parameters in equation (8). A simpler way, however, is to introduce
nine apparel group-specific intercepts, D1,. .., D9,in the matrix of explanatory
variables:
pHK = aio + a1D1 + .. . +a9Dg + .pPS + yH1 + 6U, + Vj1 + q. (9)
Note that the coefficient 3 now stands for the marginal component of rent
sharing net oftheeffect of product differentiation. The constant term a10 is
exactly (as + irZiO) and the coefficients on the apparel group dummies, cx1,
represent7r(Z1 —Z10)for i1,,. .. , 9.
Table 5 gives the results of regression (9). The estimate ofis 0.85, which
is higher than the estimated value of 0.53 found in regression (1). 20 However,
a test of the null hypothesis that /3 = 1 and y = = = 0 jointly can
be rejected at the 1% level, and a simple t-test of whether /3* is equal to one
against the alternative hypothesis that flisless than one can be rejected at the
18This follows directly from the formula for omitted variable bias. Suppose the true model
is:
y =X3+ u,
with E(u) =0and E(uu') =cr2I,and the misspecified model is:
y =X1i3+u,
whereX1 is a subset of X, X =[X1,X2J.X contains the first r variables of X, omitting
the remaining (k —r)variables. Then b, the estimated coefficient vector from the misspecified
model, is such that:
E(b) =(X'1X1)XX/3.
Thus:
E(b1) a,,r÷13r+1 + ... + a,$f3$,t = 1,...,r
wherea,+i,.. .,alk are the elements in the throwof (X'1X1)1X'1X2. See Johnston
(1985) p.260.
'9See Rodriguez (1979) and Krishna (1987).
20The estimate of 0.85 is probably biased upward due to our omission of Z1, and Z2e.
(See footnote 18.) Even so, as mentioned in the text, a t-test of whether j3 =1can be
rejected at the 20% level. It would appear, then, that despite our "bending over backwards"
to incorporate quality differenc'es in the model, there is still a portion of the US-Hong Kong
price differential which may be attributed to rent-sharing.
1820% significance level. In other words, a significant price differential between
Hong Kong imports and US-produced apparel exists which cannot be explained
by the fact that the two products may not be identical. We conclude that rent
sharing is the most likely explanation for the difference.21
Notealso that, as anticipated, the estimate of q5 given in Table 5 exceeds
that of g given in Table 1. In fact, the introduction of quality differences changes
the direction of the effect of quota size on the Hong Kong price, althoughis
not significantly different from zero.
The intercepts (a + 7rZ) for i = 1, ...,10are shown in Table 6. These in-
clude both the fixed component of rent sharing and the fixed effect of quality dif-
ferences and there is no way we can distinguish between the two effects. In fact,
it is possible that the "fixed effects" we omitted in regression (1) represented
not quality differences but differences in the fixed component of rent sharing.
The introduction of "fixed effects" therefore does not destroy our earlier results
—atworst, the marginal component of rent sharing is less substantial than
that obtained from regression (1), but it is significant nonetheless; at best, the
apparel groups have different fixed components of rent sharing and our earlier
results are strengthened.
8 Conclusions
Our main objective in this paper was to develop ways of testing the hypothesis
of perfect competition everywhere in the quota- restrained market for apparel.
We examined a broad implication of this hypothesis in the light of US clothing
imports from Hong Kong, specifically that if the hypothesis were trueand the
products homogeneous, then the Hong Kong price inclusive of the license price
and adjusted for tariffs and transportation costs, should equal the US price.
The two prices may differ if there exists monopsony power in the market for
apparel, which may or may not be combined with some kind of market powerin
the license market. Noting that simple product market power is not sufficient
to generate this difference, we were careful to distinguish between "rent appro-
priation" by product market power and "rent sharing", which arisesbecause of
market power on the part of the buyers. Rent appropriation affects the potential
license price which is the difference in the US price and the Hong Kong price,
adjusted for tariffs and transport costs but exclusive of the license price.Rent
sharing determines the distribution of these potential rents betweenthe license
owners and the buyers.
We found significant evidence of rent sharing in the data we collected on ten
apparel groups. Recognizing that this could be due to compositionaldifferences
in US production compared to Hong Kong exports, we developed a wayof
testing for the existence of such differences. We did not findthese differences
to be significant on the whole. We alo attempted to incorporate somenotion
21This is subject to the same reservations as discussed in footnote 14.
19of product differentiation and found that this did not entirely close the gap
between the US and Hong Kong prices.
Our work gives some support for the existence of buying power in the quota-
constrained market for apparel imports from Hong Kong together with some
market power in the license market. Now Hong Kong is probably the one case
most likely to satisfy the assumption of perfect competition. Even here, however,
this assumption does not seem to hold. This casts some doubt on the prevailing
practice of assuming perfect competition everywhere in empirical work on the
MFA. Based on the prices of quota licenses in Hong Kong, current estimates of
the quota premium are as high as 25% of total export value. Our results suggest
that even these figures may be too small, as some 15-50% of the rent is retained
in the US. The implication is that the overall welfare cost imposed by the MFA
on exporting countries may be even heavier than initially feared —besidesthe
acknowledged reduction in trade volume, these countries are not receiving the
full amount of their quota rent.
It is worth emphasizing that we have not addressed the issue of testing for
product market power, which is the focus of much of the theoretical work in the
area, but have focused on a new angle that is emphasized in the trade press,
namely, the issue of rent sharing. It is possible to test for product market
imperfections by essentially looking at their consequence, i.e. the existence of
price-cost margins. This can be done using calibration or computable partial
equilibrium models as done by Dixit (1988), Krishna, Hogan and Swagel (1989)
and Baldwin and Krugman (1988) among others. Alternatively, fully-specified
econometric models of the industry can be estimated. However, data require-
ments for such models often cannot be met as available information is limited
and cost estimates are hard to obtain. It is likely that work along the lines of
Mody et al. (1990a, 1990b) will help in obtaining the cost data needed.
We chose not to focus on product market imperfections here as there are a
large number of suppliers in the apparel market. In the future, we hope to extend
our work in three directions. Firstly, we plan to extend the scope of our study
to include other developing countries in order to provide further insights and
to check the generality of our results. Secondly, we intend to study US apparel
trade with non-restricted countries as well to see if price differentials also exist
which cannot be explained by quality differences —ifsuch price differentials
are observed, then our finding of rent sharing in the MFA could instead simply
be an indication of the absence of purchasing power parity. Thirdly, we plan to
examine license price paths themselves to test for allegations of price fixing in
explicitly dynamic settings. Work on these areas should considerably enhance
our understanding of how these markets function and the proper assumptions
to make in evaluating the effects of the MFA as well as proposed reforms.
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RESULTS FOR THE HOMOGENEOUS GOODS MODEL(EQUATION 1)
Dependent variable K


















Number of observations =75
Standard errors are in brackets beneath the estimatesof the parameters.
(These standard errors do not differ appreciably from thoseobtained with the
White (1984) correction, therefore we discount thepossibility of heterosceclas-
ticity in our sample.)
aSignificantat the 1% level.
Results of hypothesis-testing:
F-statistic for joint test of /31 and c= = = = 0:
F25.9983 —rejectthe null hypothesis at the 1% level.
t-statjstic for test of /3 =1:
t-8.7699 —rejectthe null hypothesis at the 1% level.
24TABLE 2
THE 10 APPAREL GROUPS ANDTHEIR
COMPONENT MFA SUB-CATEGORIES
LApparel Group (j) J i P i2=3* 4*j =5s1
1.Dresses 336 43663
2. Skirts [2 442 642
3. PIaysui 337 637
4. Sweaters 345
5. Trousers 347/8 447/8J
L6• Men's Coats 334
434__J
L7•Women'sCoats 335435J 8. Woven Shirts 340 341
9. Knit Shirts 338/9 438
lO.Underwear 352 652







REGRESSION RESULTS: THE COMPOSITIONEFFECT
The numbers in parenthesesare t-statjstjcs. a
Significantat the 1% level.
bSignificantat the 2.5% level.
Significant at the 5% level.
dSignificantat the 10% level.
26Interpretation
Do not reject H0 : 021031 =
Donot reject H0 :
Do not reject H0 : 022 ==
Donot reject H0 : a2 22 =°320
Donot reject H0 : 023= 0b
Reject H0 : a3023
Donot reject H0: 024 034
Reject Ho:a4024034._0a
Donot reject H0: •..
RejectHo:a5g25_g45
Donot reject H0: 026°36
RejectH0: a6076°360
Donot reject H0 : 027037
RejectH0: &7 =027=03
Donot reject H0: 028=...=
Donot reject H0: a8 =028.=f'58= 0
Donot reject H0 : 029 =039
Do not reject H0 :cr9029039
Do not reject H0 : 0210
RejectH0: a100210
TABLE 4






















G ALfll itttue1 io level.
At the 5% level.
27TABLE 5
RESULTS FOR THE FIXED EFFECTS MODEL(EQUATION 9)











































Number of observations = 75
*Standarderrors are in brackets beneath the estimates of theparameters.
Significant at the 1% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
Result of hypothesis-testing:
t-statjstjc for test of H0 :/3 = 1 vs H1: /3< 1:
t-1.1742 —rejectthe null hypothesis at the 20% level.
F-statistic for test of H0 : /3 = 1,y= = q5 = 0:
F3.9824 —rejectthe null hypothesis at the 1% level.
28TABLE 6
INTERCEpTS CALCULATED FROM TABLE5
29A Data Sources and ProductGroup Defini-
tions
The data utilized in this study cover the timeperiod 1981 to 1988 and pertain
to three broad areas: domestically-producedapparel; imported apparel from
Hong Kong; and licenses for apparel imports fromHong Kong.
The quantity and value of apparel produced in theUS were obtained from
Ctu-rent Industrial Reports published by the USDepartment of Commerce, Bu- reau of the Census. The statistics in these publicationare based on surveys
of all known manufacturers and jobbers(except the very small firms excluded
from the scope of the survey) andrepresent total US production of most major garments. 22Weassume that all domestic production is consumeddomestically, i.e. domestic production equals sales to the homemarket. This is not unrea-
sonable since the proportion of domesticapparel production exported overseas
is relatively small (less than 10% ingeneral.)
The quantity of apparel imports fromHong Kong as well as quota utiliza-
tion ratios were obtained from ErpiredPerformance Reports issued by the US
Department of Commerce, Office of Textiles andApparel. The value of Hong
Kong imports was obtained from a specialcomputer run using US IM-145 Im-
port Trade tapes at the US Department of Commerce, Officeof Textiles and
Apparel. The value of imports used is in terms ofcustoms value, which is gener-
ally defined to be the price actually paidor payable for merchandise when it is
sold for exportation to the US,excluding US import duties, freight, insurance,
and other charges incurred inbringing the merchandise to the US. 23
Dataon US apparel production is classified according to StandardIndustrial
Classification (SIC) codes. Imports of restrainedtextiles and apparel, however,
are classified according to the MFAcategories of the US, which in turn are
groupings of seven- digit Tariff Schedule of the US(TSUSA) categories. Con- cordance tables are available which link theSIC codes with the TSUSA clas-
sification but there is no straightforwardmapping between the SIC and MFA
classification systems. The MFAcategories classify the different types ofap- parel by fabric type e.g. cotton, wool and manmadefiber. The SIC categories,
on the other hand, classify apparel as men's,boys', women's/misses'/juniors'
and girls'/children's/jnfants with furthersubdivisions according to fabric type.
Quantity figures are sometimes printed for certainfabric-type subdivisions, but value figures are not available.Moreover, the coverage of the individual SIC
categories has changed many times over theyears considered (1981 —1988). 221988, anumber of new establishments were added to thesurvey. Most of these estab- lishments began operating alter the 1982 Census.The Bureau made no attempt to determine
when they began operating or to obtainprior years' data. Therefore, the 1988 datamay not be strictly comparable to previousyears.
23The customs import value dividedby the import quantity is exactly the f.o.b. Hong
Kong price which is referred to in the text, and there isevery reason to expect that this price includes the import license price.
30Faced with these complications, we had torearrange the data into new
(larger) groups comprising several SIC and MFAcategories, such that there
was minimal overlap between the categories acrossgroups. We defined ten such
groups: (1) dresses, (2) skirts, (3) playsuits, (4) sweaters, (5)trousers, (6) men's
coats, (7) women's coats, (8) woven shirts, (9) knit shirts, and(10) underwear.
As a convenient intermediate step to keep the USproduction data fairly con-
sistent over the eight years, we first assembled the SICcategories of similar items
by: men's/boys' outerwear; women's/girls'/ infants'outerwear; men's/boys' nightwear and underwear; and women's/girls'/irifants'nightwear and underwear. Ap-
pendix Table A-i lists the production groupings 24andAppendix Table A-2
shows the relation between these groupings, the MFAcategories and the ten
apparel groups.
The domestic price of each of the tenapparel groups was computed as a
quantity-weighted average of the unit values of the productiongroupings which make up the group. 25
Similarly, the import price of each apparelgroup was taken to be a quantity-
weighted average of the unit values of the MFA categories which makeup the
group, and the quota utilization ratio for each apparelgroup was calculated
as a quota-weighted average of the utilization ratios of thecomponent MFA categories. 26
Our trade data exclude the MFA 800 series (silk blendsor non- cotton veg-
24 concordancebetween these production groupings and theircomponent SIC categories is available from the authors.
25The reason why we use quantity weights is as follows. Eachapparel group jconsistsof one or more production groupings 1, iI,... ,n. Let P, denote the unit price of apparel






26Eachapparel group jconsistsof a few MFA categories i. We use quantity weights to
compute the import price for an apparel group from the import prices of its component MFA
categories for the same reason explained in the previous footnote. Similarly, ifwe let U, be the utilization ratio for apparel group j,. V1,be the total quota on apparel group j,U1, be the utilization ratio for MFA category i of apparelgroup jandV, be the quota on MFA




31etable fibers), which was first introduced in 1986.This may introduce some
inconsistency in the data set since the US production dataare classified ac-
cording to type of apparel rather than material. Forexample, for Group 1
(dresses), the US price and US sales figuresmay partly reflect prices and sales of silk dresses but the import prices andquantities will not. However, a quick
glance at US production figures for which we havesome information on fabric
breakdown indicates that this should notpose a serious problem. 27
Informationon tariffs and transport costs by MFAcategory was taken from
the 1986 U.S. IM-145 Import Tradetapes. As 1986 was the only year for which
we had reliable data on tape, we assumed littleor no change in the ad valorem
tariff rates and unit transport costs in theperiod under study, and applied
the 1986 figures to the years 1981through 1988. 28Thetariff rates and unit
transport costs of each of the ten apparelgroups were computed as weighted
averages of the tariff rates and transport costs of the MFAcategories comprising the group, thus insofar as the relativecomposition of the groups changed over
the years, so too did thegroup tariff rates and transport costs. 29
Also,note that MFA category 440 was not underquota for any of the eight
years we consider. In the earlier years, there were also several othercategories that were not under quota. Suchcategories were not used in computing the
apparel group license utilization ratios.
Information on the concentration in licenseholdings in Hong Kong came from the 1990 Preliminary AllocationQuota Holders' List issued by the Tex-
27Consider, for example, two items most likelyto be made of silk: women's dresses and
slips. In 1985 and 1986, dresses made of material other thancotton, wool or man-made fibers
accounted for only about 4% of the totalquantity of women's, misses' and juniors' dresses produced; and 0% of the women's full-length and half-length slips produced in the US were made of material other than cotton, woolor man-made fibers.
28In fact, ad valorem tariff rateschanged very little between the GATT rounds so this is not an unreasonable assumption.
29We used value weights for the advalorem tariffs and quantity weights for the unittransport costs. Let idenotethe ad valorem tariff rate on apparelgroup j, t, the ad valorem tariff rate on MFA category i of apparelgroup 7,P,,the unit price of MFA category i of apparel
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32tile Controls Registry in Hong Kong. Whereas thereare frequent temporary
transfers of licenses, permanent transfers occur much lessoften, 30andthe li-
cense allocation in all probability does not alter much over theyears. Thus, we
applied the 1990 allocation for the years 1981 through 1988 andcalculated the
concentration index for each group as quantity-weightedaverages of the concen-
tration indices of the MFA categories that makeup the group. As in the case
of the tariff and transport data mentioned above, insofaras the weights change
from year to year, so will the concentration index,even if the allocation remains
fixed.
Note that quotas are imposed on (and hence licensesare allocated for) the
following categories jointly: 333/334/335, with a sub-quota on 333/334 and
a sub-quota on 335; and 633/634/635, with a sub-quotaon 633/634 and a
sub-quota on 635. The licenses for sub-categories 333 and 334are completely
transferable, but there is less flexibility in transferring licenses betweenthese
two sub-categories and sub-category 335. Thesame applies to sub- categories
633, 634 and 635. We had information on the ratio of licensesutilized, and
holdings of licenses for 333/4, 633/4, 335 and 635, but wewere only interested
in categories 334 and 634, which arecomponents of Group 6 (men's coats) and
categories 335 and 635, which are components of Group 7(women'scoats). Given the transferability within sub-categories,we took the ratio of licenses
utilized for category 334 to be the ratio of licenses utilized forcategories 333/4
together, and similarly for category 634. We did the same forconcentration
indices.
For categories 338/9, separate sub-quotasare imposed on 338/9-T (tank
tops); and 338/9-0 (other knit tops, excluding tank tops.) In order to calculate
the concentration index for the category 338/9as a whole, we had to weight
the indices for the sub- categories by their shares in totalshipments. The same
applied to categories 347 and 348, i.e., we had to weight the concentration indices
by their shares in total shipments in order to get the concentration indexfor
347/8 as a whole.









• As a percentage of restraint limit.
33APPENDIX TABLE A-l
US PRODUCTION GROUPINGS AND DESCRIPTIONS
1. M&B casual, non-tailored sport coats'.
2. M&B suits, md uniforms'.
3. M&B overcoats, top coats, car coats, mci. uniforms.
4. M&B raincoats, mci uniform.
5. M&B tailored suit-type dress and sportcoats, mci uniform'.
6. M&B separate vests cx sweater vests'.
7. M&B woven dress & business shirts, mci uniform.
8. M&B woven sports shirts.
9. M&B t-shirts & tank-tops for outerwear.
10. M&B all other knit shirts cx sweatshirts.
11. M&B sweaters, sweater vests, knit cardigans andpullovers.
12. M&B dress & sport trousers, mci uniform.
13. M&B jeans & dungarees.
14. M&B casual slacks.
15. M&B shorts.
16. M&B heavy non-tailored outer jacketscx ski, mci padded vests'.
17. M&B light non-tailored outer jackets.
18. M&B down & feather filled jackets andvests.
19. M&B sweatshirts.
20. M&B sweatpants.
21. M&B jogging suits.
22. M&B swjmwear'.
23. M&B ski jackets & vests.
24. M&B ski pants.
25. M&B ski suits & overalls'.
26. M&B work pants.
27. M&B coveralls, overalls & jumpsuits'.
28. M&B work shirts (not knit).
29. M&B overall & work-type jackets
30. W/G/I dresses.
31. W/G/I suits & pantsuits.
32. W/G/I overalls, coveralls & jumpsuits.
33. W/G/I woven blouses & shirts.
34. W/G/I t-shirts & tank-tops forouterwear.
35. W/G/J all other knit shirtscx sweatshirts
36. W/G/I sweaters.
37. W/G/I coats &capes, cx down, rain, fw or leather (mci girls' and infants' jackets &
snowsuits).
3438. W/G/I tailored suit-type jackets.
39. W/G/I non-tailored outer jacketscx ski.
40. W/G/I vests'.




45. W/G/I jogging suits.
46. WIG/I swiinsujts.
47. W/G ski jackets & vests.
48. W/G ski suits'.
49. W/G ski pants.
50. W/G body suits'.
51. W/G/I shorts.
52. WIG/I playsuits, beach tops &roinpers.
53. W/G/I skirts.
54. W/G/I pants.
55. M&B pajamas & other nightwear'.
56. M&B robes'.
57. M&B undershirts.
58. M&B thermal underwear'.
59. M&B knit briefs & shorts.
60. M&B woven boxer shorts.
61. W/G/I slips.
62. W/G/I panties.
63. W/G/I union suits, camisoles & thermals(md infants' panties, slips & undershirts).
64. W/G/I nightgowns'.
65. WIG/I pajamas'.
66. W/G/I other nightweare.
67. WIG/I robes & housecoats'.
68. W/G/I brassiers, bralettes & bandeux.
69. W/G/I combinations & one-pieces'
70. W/G/I garter belts'.
Items marked with an asteriskare not included in our data set.
M&B: Men's and boys
W/G/I: Women's/Gjrls'/Jnfants
35APPENDIX TABLE A-2
RELATION BETWEEN THE TEN APPAREL GROUPS
AND THE MFA AND US PRODUCTION GROUPINGS
Apparel Group MFA CategoriesUS Production Groupings
1. Dresses 336, 436, 636 30
2. Skirts 342a, 442, 642 53
3. Playsuits 337, 637 52b
4. Sweaters 345, 445, 446,
645, 646
11, 36
5. Trousers 347, 348, 447,
448, 647, 648
12, 13, 14, 15,
20, 21*, 24, 26,
44 45*, 49, 51,54
6. Men's Coats 334, 434, 634 3, 4, 16, 17,
21, 23, 29
7. Women's Coats335c, 435, 635 37, 38, 39, 42,
45*, 47
8. Woven Shirts 340, 341, 440,
640, 641
7, 8, 28, 33
9. Knit Shirts 338, 339, 438,
638, 639
9, 10, 19, 34,
35, 43
10. Underwear 352d, 652 57, 59, 60, 61,
62, 63
Items marked with an asterisk are suits (e.g.jogging suits) which comprise
both trousers as well as coats. Eachgroup is thus credited with half the quantity
and value figures of these items.
aSomeitems in MFA category 342may also be found in production grouping
31 (women's suits and pantsuits.)
bProductiongrouping 52 may also include some items from MFA category
859.
Some items in MFA category 335may also be included in production
grouping 31 (women's suits and pantsuits.)
dSomeitems in MFA category 352may also be included in production
grouping 67 (women's/girls'/ infants' robes and housecoats.)
Production grouping 63may also include some items from MFA category
459.
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